Information and Rivalry: How Do Firms Respond to Competitors’ Investment Decision under Environmental Uncertainty? -- Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Companies’ Adoption of Solar Energy by Lu, Shaohua
 
Information and Rivalry: How Do Firms Respond to Competitors’ Investment Decision 
under Environmental Uncertainty? -- Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Companies’ 





Fisher College of Business 
Ohio State University 
256A Fisher Hall 2100 Neil Avenue 
Columbus, OH 43210 





Fisher College of Business 
Ohio State University 
836 Fisher Hall 2100 Neil Avenue 
Columbus, OH 43210 
Tel: (614)-247-6851  




Preliminary draft for comments: 
Please do not cite or quote without permission. 
 
Abstract 
A broad literature in strategy examines how competitors’ presence affects the focal firm’s strategic 
decision making. This stream of research identifies imitation and deterrence as two distinct patterns, 
and concludes with an inverted U-shaped relationship. Yet, we propose in this study that under 
environmental uncertainty competition could both strengthen and undermine the benefits of 
imitation, and consequently lead to a U-shaped relationship. Combining both information- and 
competition-based theories, we develop stylized models of how firms update their beliefs and make 
strategic decision under environmental uncertainty. The analytical results suggest a U-shaped 
relationship, and we find empirical evidence consistent with our predictions using data on the U.S. 
electric utility companies’ commitment to develop utility-scale solar projects.  
* We would like to thank Ashton Hawk and Michael Leiblein for their invaluable suggestions and comments. We are 
also grateful to Joe Mahoney, Anne Marie Knott, and 2014 ACAC Research Development Workshop student 
participants for their insightful comments. All remaining mistakes are our own.  
 
 
                                                          
Strategy is about the choice of direction of firms (Rumelt, 1994: 42). A broad literature examines 
how competitor’s prior choices affect the focal firm’s decision making, and identifies imitation and 
avoidance as two distinct decision-making patterns concluding with an inverted U-shaped 
association. Specifically, the benefits of imitation induce firms to make similar strategic choices; as 
the intensity of competition increases, it countervails such benefits and leads to avoidance in firms’ 
decision-making (e.g., Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Anand, et al, 2009; Koçak, & Özcan, 2013; Alcácer, 
et al, 2015). We posit in this study, however, that competition could also strengthen the benefits of 
imitation and thus generate imitative decision making under environmental uncertainty. Combining 
information- and competition-based theories, we develop stylized models of how firms update their 
beliefs and make strategic decisions in a highly uncertain environment. The analytical results suggest 
a U-shaped relationship: avoidance is followed by imitation as the intensity of competition increases. 
Using data on the U.S. electric utility companies’ commitment to develop utility-scale solar projects, 
we find supporting evidence for our predictions.  
Imitation is a common observation of how firms respond to competitors’ strategic decisions 
under uncertainty (please see Lieberman & Asaba, 2006 for a comprehensive review). The rationale 
behind imitation includes reducing the cost of searching, legitimation benefits, positive externality 
such as knowledge spillovers and access to resources, and serving as an external information source. 
Meanwhile, competitors’ decision might have a structural impact on the focal firm’s decision-making 
(Bain, 1959; Tirole, 1988). In an oligopolistic market, one firm’s payoffs depend on the strategic 
choices made by competitors. Specifically, competitors’ action enhances the intensity of competition, 
which in turn reduces the benefits of imitation and hinders the focal firm from making the same 
choice. Combining the two-fold impact of competitors’ action, the extent studies have identified an 
inverted U-shaped relationship: firms tend to imitate first, but avoid later taking the same action 
with intensifying competition. While our work is closely related to the conventional wisdom on the 
1 
 
dual role of competitors’ prior choice, we recognize that in a highly uncertain environment these 
two mechanisms might not independently affect how firms respond to competitors’ presence. In 
addition to the countervailing effect, increasing competition could also affect firms’ decision making 
by reinforcing the information-based benefits of imitation.  
We anchor our formal analysis on both Bayesian observational leaning models in the herd 
behavior literature (also known as information cascades) and competitive rivalry in Industrial 
Organization (IO) theory, and propose a U-shaped relationship concerning how competitors’ 
presence affects firms’ decision-making under environmental uncertainty. The analytical results show 
that, consistent with previous observations, imitation is likely to take place when the intensity of 
competition is low and the avoidance becomes salient as the structural impact of competitors’ 
presence increases. Nevertheless, our formal modeling efforts also indicate that firms tend to imitate 
at a high level of rivalry because competitors’ action reveals extremely optimistic information about 
future payoffs from investing in a novel market. We conduct empirical analysis using data on the U.S. 
utility companies’ construction of large-scale solar projects. The results lend support to our 
predictions. This research contributes to the literature on firms’ decision making under uncertainty. 
We focus on the highly uncertain environmental in which it is difficult for all firms to predict future 
performance, and endeavor to untangle how firms make decision under such uncertain situations. It 
responds to the call for studies that “use environmental conditions to distinguish among theories” 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006: 376). In addition, our empirical examination enhances our 
understanding of how utility companies commit to novel energy sources.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of 
theoretical background, and proceeds to the basic model structure and extended analytical models. 
We then describe the empirical context and develop hypotheses concerning utility companies’ 
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decision on building large-scale solar projects. The empirical analysis results are followed by 
discussion of implications and opportunities for future work. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Making strategic decisions is fundamentally characterized by uncertainty given the inherently 
stochastic state of world. Uncertainty reflects an inability of a firm to predict the range of possible 
outcomes associated with a particular action or behavior (Knight, 1921; Milliken, 1987). It is 
generally defined as a lack of information regarding how to specify a unique distribution appropriate 
for a given situation (Mosakowski, 1997). Future payoffs from investing in the novel business 
domain hinge upon the realization of the state of the world, when firms are confronted with 
environmental uncertainty, e.g., disturbances caused by the shift in customer demands or 
diminishing marginal utility of incremental product improvement (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Adner, 2002; Adner and Zemsky, 2005), or the emergence of new technologies (Dosi, 1982; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Hence, it 
is difficult for all firms to predict the consequences of taking a certain action (Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006). Environmental uncertainty is also analogous to the notion of “market uncertainty”, which 
refers to volatility in market conditions and therefore affects all firms’ decision making to the same 
degree (Beckman, et al, 2004; Gaba & Terlaak, 2013).  
A common justification for firms’ decision making under uncertainty is that they tend to 
imitate the choices made by competitors (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Small and medium-sized 
commercial banks, for instance, tend to follow large banks into new geographic markets and mimic 
their new products and service offerings (Koçak & Özcan, 2013). A variety of theoretical 
perspectives offer explanations for firms’ imitation. Specifically, it can reduce the cost of searching. 
Drawing insights from Cyert and March (1963), Dimaggio and Powell (1983), for example, argue 
that imitation is an inexpensive search yielding “a viable solution with little expense” when “the 
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environment creates symbolic uncertainty” (1983: 151). Moreover, firms gain legitimation benefits 
from imitation by conforming to audience expectations, (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984; 
Carroll & Hannan, 2000). Furthermore, firms tend to imitate because of positive externalities, e.g., 
technological spillovers and access to specialized labor and intermediate inputs (Marshall, 1892). In 
addition, the herd behavior literature draws attention to the information component of strategic 
choices; the key idea is that “actions reflect information” (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Wlech, 
1992, 1998; Kennedy, 2002; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). Hence, imitation is a common observation 
concerning how competitors’ presence affects firms’ decision making.  
The broad range of research on imitation can be organized into two categories based on the 
underlying information assumption. One stream of research assumes that the early movers’ choices 
are seen as successful. Firms that first make investment choice are aware of the unique, stochastic 
causal structure between inputs and outputs, whereas others are in the state of ignorance. It is thus 
straightforward that firms are expected to imitate competitors’ prior investment decisions. 
Alternatively, under environmental uncertainty, no firms are able to predict the consequences of 
taking a certain action. The herd behavior literature suggests that while firms observe information 
from the environment, update their beliefs, and make decisions, their actions reveal to other firms 
the private information they observe from the environment. “Information cascades”, for instance, 
occur when firms make decision based on others’ actions and without regard to its own observation 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Wlech, 1992). Our study focuses on the environmental uncertainty, 
and thus more related to the information-based argument in the herd behavior literature.   
There is an alternative view of how firms’ decision-making is affected by competitors’ prior 
choices, one that has its root in the IO economics literature and focuses on the structural impact of 
competitors’ presence. Specifically, the classical Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm 
suggests that firms’ conduct is a function of industry structure (Bain, 1959; Tirole, 1988). In an 
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oligopolistic market, for instance, firms no longer encounter a passive environment as in a perfectly 
competitive market. One firm’s investment decision would influence the demand and product price, 
and ultimately affect others’ expected returns for investing in the same domain. 
The concept of competitive interaction depicts the interdependence between competing 
firms. It has two important implications for how competitors’ presence affects firm’s decision 
making. Firstly, rivalry influences a firm’s estimation on its future investment return. Firms might 
choose differentiation strategies as a response designed to attenuating the intensity of competition. 
Japanese automotive suppliers, for example, are less likely to enter the North American market when 
there are a large number suppliers competing in the market, but the likelihood of entry increases 
when the number of existing suppliers is small (Martin, et al, 1998). Secondly, anticipating its 
influence on other firms’ strategic choices, first movers would exploit the possibility to their 
advantages. This idea brings about firms’ reaction functions that generate the best choice for each 
possible action taken by competitors. Excess capacity, for example, represents one of the structural 
entry barriers that allow incumbent firms to deter potential entrants1 (Bain, 1954; Spence, 1977).  
Combining the dual role of competitors’ prior choice, the extent literature has identified an 
inverted U-shaped relationship concerning how firms’ decision making is affected by competitors’ 
presence. Specifically, firms tend to imitate competitors’ choice with low competitive intensity. 
Nevertheless, increasing competition would countervail the benefits of imitation, and ultimately lead 
to avoidance in firms’ decision making. The implicit assumption here is that competition has an 
independent, negative effect on firms’ decision making. However, in a highly uncertain environment, 
the dual role that competitors’ action plays in firms’ decision making might not be isolated, though 
in different directions. We argue that the rising level of competition could also strengthen the role of 
1  This argument has been well developed in industrial economics theory, but lacks empirical evidence. Lieberman (1987), for 
example, investigates thirty-eight chemical product industries and finds out that the incumbent firms rarely build excess capacity to 
deter potential entrants. 
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competitors’ prior choices as an external information source and thus enhance the benefits of 
imitation.  
To examine the association between competitors’ presence and firms’ decision-making, we 
formally model the process of how firms make investment decisions when it is difficult for all firms 
to predict the payoffs to taking a certain action. In particular, we focus on the selection activity in 
the behavioral decision-making framework (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Nelson 
and Winter (1982), for example, formally develop the “search and selection” framework when they 
interpret long-run productivity as “moving along” an existing production function and “shifting” to 
a new one. Their work has inspired an exploration of studies on search activities that apply “NK” 
model of evolutionary biology to firm-level adaptation in a complex environment (e.g., Levinthal, 
1997; Rivkin, 2000; Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008). Nevertheless, 
insufficient attention has been drawn to the selection process that becomes prominent in the 
uncertain environment. A general selection process specifies “the benefits and costs that are 
weighted by the organizations that will decide to adopt or not to adopt a new innovation” (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982: 262). Previous studies on technology and innovation, for example, have shown that 
incumbent firms have appropriation advantage by possessing complementary assets when facing 
disruptive technologies (e.g., Teece, 1986; Helfat, 1994; Tripsas, 1997; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005). Yet 
firms need to find it worthwhile or profitable before choosing to utilize the assets and seek 
cooperation with technology start-ups. We build our formal analysis based on the selection activity.  
In the next section, we first introduce the basic model structure of firms’ decision-making 
under uncertainty and then proceed to the analytic models that incorporate both information- and 




We develop in this section a prototypical model with simplistic structure. It allows us to demonstrate 
the basic intuitions behind the decision-making process. Consider firms’ making investment 
decisions in a novel domain. In accordance with the general selection process, firms evaluate future 
payoffs and make a decision only when it is perceived as worthwhile. In other words, profit function 
specifies the investment decision rule. At time t firm i’s profits from investing in the new area is 
denoted as 𝜋𝑖,𝑡. Assuming a downward demand function and a monotonically-increasing production 
function of investment, we model a firm’s profits as a function of investment: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −
1
2
𝐼𝑖,𝑡2,                                                                  (1)  
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the investment choice made by firm i at time t, and 𝜇 is productivity parameter2. The 
profit function is concave in investment. It exhibits properties that we can generalize the results to 
more broad cases, e.g., diminishing marginal investment return and inefficient phase of 
overinvestment. 
Productivity parameter, 𝜇, carries the uncertainty of decision-making. If the value of 𝜇 is 
known ex ante when firms make investment decisions, firm i can choose the amount of investment 
that maximizes its profits. The first order condition by differentiating expression (1) with regard to 
investment 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 shows that firm i would choose the amount given by 𝐼∗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇. The optimal 
investment choice derived here is consistent with findings in an empirical study conducted by Knott 
(2008) that firms with higher productivity tend to invest more. 
To reflect uncertainty inherent in the decision-making process, assume that the value of 𝜇 is 
fixed but not completely known when firms make decisions. The profit function with unknown 
productivity parameter is specified as 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −
1
2
𝐼𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝜀,                                                      (2) 
2  To simplify the calculation, we assign 1/2 as the coefficient of the squared term in the profit function. In this way, the optimal 




                                                          
where 𝜀 is the stochastic noise term. Assume that 𝜀 follows a normal distribution with zero mean 
and precision ℎ (equal to the inverse of variance), i.e., 𝜀~𝑁(0,ℎ). Firm i thus chooses the investment 
that maximizes its expected profits. Take expectation on both side of expression (2), and the first 
order condition yields 𝐼∗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝜇), where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝜇) is firm i’s estimate of 𝜇 at time t. As suggested by 
this optimal investment condition under uncertainty, firm i relies on its beliefs to make an 
investment decision. High expectations or optimal beliefs increase the likelihood of investment. 
Firm i updates its beliefs about investment return 𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝜇) when additional information is 
revealed from the environment. In accordance with Bayesian statistical decision theory (DeGroot, 
1970), we model the belief updating as a convex combination of a firm’s prior beliefs and the 
information it observes from the environment. Specifically, let each firm’s prior belief be given by a 
normal distribution of 𝜇 with mean 𝑚𝑖,0 and precision ℎ𝑖,0, i.e., 𝜇~𝑁(𝑚𝑖,0,ℎ𝑖,0). The prior mean, 
𝑚𝑖,0, describes firm i’s expected payoffs before it perceives information from the environment. A 
larger value of 𝑚𝑖,0 indicates that firm i considers the investment as more profitable. The precision 
ℎ𝑖,0 is equal to the inverse of variance of firm i’s prior belief. A larger value of ℎ𝑖,0 implies more 
confidence of firm i in its prior beliefs. 
Information about the distribution of 𝜇 is disclosed over time. Suppose at time t the 
information that firm i observes is given by, 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (3) 
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 are stochastic noise terms. 𝜀𝑡 reflects environmental disturbance; it shapes the 
information perceived by all firms attempting to enter the novel area. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, on the contrary, is firm-
specific, and characterizes the variance in observed information associated with heterogeneity of 
firm resources and capabilities. Assume that 𝜀𝑡’s and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡’s are independent and normally distributed 
with zero mean and precision ℎ𝜀 and ℎ𝑖,𝜀, respectively (i.e., 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0,ℎ𝜀), and  𝜀𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0,ℎ𝑖,𝜀)). A 
smaller precision value of ℎ𝜀 indicates a larger variance of information perceived from the 
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environment, and thus implies a more disruptive technological change. In contrast, a smaller value 
of ℎ𝑖,𝜀, or equivalently a larger value of variance, suggest that firm i is deemed low capability of 
cumulating related knowledge. Given that 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 are normally distributed and independence, the 
information 𝑧𝑖,𝑡  that firm i observes from the environment at time t stays normal with mean 𝜇 and 








Given the normality and independence assumptions of 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡, firm i’s estimate of 
posterior distribution of 𝜇 at time t follows normal distribution with mean ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 and precision ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
given by, 
                                              ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸�𝜇�?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1,ℎ1,𝑡−1, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡,ℎ𝑖�   

















∑ 𝑧𝑖,𝑠𝑡𝑠=1                      (4) 
       ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + ℎ𝑖 = ℎ𝑖,0 + 𝑡ℎ𝑖                                                               (5) 
As shown by expression (4), firm i’s estimation of posterior distribution of 𝜇 is a weighted average 




, for a 
two-stage learning model), and the weight to external information is ℎ𝑖
ℎ𝑖,0+𝑡ℎ𝑖
. Observe that the 
precision of firm i’s posterior distribution of 𝜇 increases by ℎ𝑖 in each period of time. In other words, 
firm i’s capability of predicting future investment payoffs improves over time as more information is 
revealed from the environment. The Bayesian inference process demonstrates that in the limit the 
value of 𝜇 will become fully known. Furthermore, the learning process corroborates findings in 
empirical studies about the competitive dynamics between incumbent firms and new entrants. An 
established firm, for instance, tends to place more emphasis on prior beliefs reflected by a large ℎ𝑖,0. 
When facing disruptive changes characterized by a small ℎ𝜖 (or equivalently small ℎ𝑖), it would be 
less motivated to invest in the new technological domain. 
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Analysis of Competitor’s Presence as Both External Information and Rivalry 
To demonstrate how competitors’ prior investment affects the focal firm’s decision-making, we 
consider a Stackelberg competition in which the leader firm 1 and the follower firm 2 provide  
identical products and compete on quantity. Firm i’s profit function is generalized as 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡(𝜇)𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −
1
2
𝐼𝑖,𝑡2 − 𝛾𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝐼𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, 
where 𝛾 denotes the type and the intensity of rivalry.3 If products are (imperfect) substitutes, for 
example, the value of 𝛾 is greater than zero, i.e., 𝛾 > 0. The cross partial derivative of firm i’s profits 
with respect to firm j’s investment is negative (i.e., 𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝐼𝑗,𝑡
< 0), which means a firm i’s profits would 




< 0), which means firm i’s marginal return on investment decreases with firm 
j’s investment4.  
Let firm 1 receive a private observation from the environment, 𝑧1,𝑡, in the beginning of time 
period t. Firm 1 then updates its beliefs about the distribution of 𝜇, and makes an investment 𝐼1,𝑡 at 
the end of time t after perceives the investment as profitable based on the posterior distribution of 𝜇. 
Meanwhile, firm 1 is aware that firm 2 observes its choice, and that its investment choice reveals 
information about 𝜇 to firm 2. Because firm 2’s investment influences its investment return, firm 1 
would exploit the possibility to its advantages. Hence, we specify firm 1’s estimation about future 
payoffs at time t as follows,  
   𝐸(𝜋1,𝑡) = 𝐸1,𝑡�𝜇�?̂?1,𝑡−1,ℎ1,𝑡−1, 𝑧1,𝑡,ℎ1�𝐼1,𝑡 −
1
2
𝐼1,𝑡2 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡 ∙ 𝐼2,𝑡�𝐼1,𝑡�,                             (6) 
where 𝐼2,𝑡�𝐼1,𝑡� is firm 2’s investment after it observes firm 1’s investment and its own private 
information from the environment. In accordance with equation (4), firm 1’s posterior estimation is 
3 Please see Appendix A for a detailed derivation of profit function with the presence of competitive interaction. 
4 We only consider 𝛾 taking positive value, i.e., 𝛾 > 0, in our model; nonetheless, the results can be applied to the case of 
complements, i.e., 𝛾 < 0. 
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given as 𝐸1,𝑡�𝜇�?̂?1,𝑡−1,ℎ1,𝑡−1, 𝑧1,𝑡,ℎ1� = (1− 𝜆1)𝜇�1,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑧1,𝑡, where 𝜆1 =
ℎ1
ℎ1,𝑡−1+ℎ1
 represents the 
extent to which firm 1 relies on external information when firm 1 forms its posterior estimation of 𝜇. 
Differentiating Equation (6) with respect to firm 1’s investment and solving the first order condition, 







𝑧1,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼2,𝑡�𝐼1,𝑡� − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
      
                                             = (1 − 𝜆1)?̂?1,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑧1,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼2,𝑡�𝐼1,𝑡� − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
,                                                    (7)  
Firm 2 observes firm 1’s investment, 𝐼1,𝑡, and perceives private information 𝑧2,𝑡+1 in the 
next period of time. Similar to the prior analysis, firm 2’s posterior estimate of 𝜇 is a combination of 
its prior beliefs and the average of external information. The expected profit function of firm 2 is 
described as                                                                           
𝐸(𝜋2,𝑡+1) = 𝐸2,𝑡+1�𝜇�?̂?2,𝑡 ,ℎ2,𝑡, 𝑧2,𝑡+1, 𝑧1,𝑡,ℎ2�𝐼2,𝑡+1 −
1
2
𝐼2,𝑡+12 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡+1𝐼2,𝑡+1.                       (8) 
Firm 2 chooses the amount of investment that maximizes its expected profits at the end of time t+1. 
Differentiate equation (8) with respect to 𝐼2,𝑡, and assuming 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 (𝑖 = 1,2) we have: 











𝐼1,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡 −
𝜆2(1−𝜆1)
2𝜆1
?̂?1,𝑡−1,                (9) 
where 𝜔 = 1 − 𝜆2𝛾
2𝜆1
, and 𝜆𝑖 =
2ℎ𝑖
ℎ𝑖,𝑡+2ℎ𝑖
 (i=1,2) denotes the extent to which firm i relies on external 
information when forming its posterior estimate about 𝜇 (See Appendix B for the proof).  
The sign of first-order derivative of 𝐼2,𝑡 with respect of 𝐼1,𝑡 (i.e., 
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
) reflects the overall 
impact of rival firms’ investments on the firm’s incentive for investment. Differentiating equation (9) 







.                                                                  (10)  
As shown in expression (9), the sign of 𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
 is contingent upon parameter 𝛾 given 𝜆1 and 𝜆2. To 
illustrate the overall impact of firm 1’s investment on firm 2’s investment, we use the following five 
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examples in which 𝛾 takes on different values, i.e., 𝛾 = 0. 15, 𝛾 = 0. 4, 𝛾 = 1/√2 = 0. 707, 𝛾 = 0. 9, 
and 𝛾 = 1.5. When 𝛾 = 1/√2, the first-order derivative of 𝐼2,𝑡 with respect of 𝐼1,𝑡 equals −1/√2, i.e.,   
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
= −1/√2. In other words, firm 2 would choose to avoid investing in the same area after 
observing firm 1’s investment (Figure 1).  
For 𝛾 < 1/√2, we use two examples, i.e., 𝛾 = 0. 15 and 𝛾 = 0. 4, to illustrate the effect of 
competitors’ presence on the focal firms’ decision-making. As shown in Figure 2 and 3, firm 2 
would be more likely to follow firm 1’s investment decision as the value of 𝛾 decreases. As a matter 
of fact, 𝛾 = 0 is a special case in which firm 1’s investment merely serves as an external information 
source heralding attractive investment opportunity.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and 2 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The intuitive interpretation is straightforward. The role of competitors’ prior investments as an 
external source of information dominates the role as competitive rivalry if it has little structural 
impacts on a firm’s profits. The extreme case is that firms choose to make the same investment 
decision as their competitors. Yet, as the level of rivalry increases, it countervails the positive impact 
of competitors’ prior investment as an external information source. When parameter 𝛾 reaches the 
value 1/√2, rivals’ investments would intimidate all potential entry. We thus develop the following 
proposition:  
PROPOSITION 1: All other things being equal, for 𝛾 < 1/√2, the smaller 𝛾 is, the more 
likely competitors’ investment is to have a positive effect on the focal firm’s incentive to 
invest in the novel business area, i.e., 𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
> 0. 
For 𝛾 > 1/√2, we use two examples, i.e., 𝛾 = 0. 9, and 𝛾 = 1.5, to illustrate the effect of 
competitors’ presence on the focal firms’ decision-making. As shown in Figure 4 and 5, firm 2 is 




Insert Figure 3 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The rationality behind this result is that competitors’ investments imply particularly favorable 
information on investment return. The fact that firm 1 chooses to invest in the new area regardless 
of vigorous rivalry indicates that the information it perceives from the environment is sufficiently 
favorable to justify its investment decision. Based on the analytical result, we develop the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2: All other things being equal, for 𝛾 > 1/√2, the larger 𝛾 is, the more 
likely competitors’ investment is to have a positive effect on the focal firm’s incentive to 
invest in the novel area, i.e., 𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
< 0. 
To illustrate the overall effect of competitors’ investments on the focal firm’s investment 
incentive, we use the following numerical example in which 𝜆1 = 0.4  and 𝜆2 = 0.2. The first 
derivative of firm 2’s investment with regard to firm 1’s investment as a function of 𝛾, the intensity 
of rivalry, is given in figure 4.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
As seen from figure 4, in which imitation is most likely to take place when the intensity of 
competitive rivalry is low or high. If we regress the incidence of competitors’ prior investment on 
the likelihood of the focal firms’ investment in the same domain, the coefficient of competitors’ 
prior entries are expected to be U-shaped holding other factors constant. In the next section, we will 
introduce the empirical context and develop specific hypotheses.  
Empirical Context and Hypotheses 
To provide a suitable context to test the predictions derived from the analytical models, we study the 
U.S. electric utility companies’ commitment to develop utility-scale solar projects. The majority of 
13 
 
prior studies focus on the implications of regulatory environment for the renewable energy adoption 
in the electric utility sector (e.g., Delmas et al, 2007; Kim, 2013; Fremeth & Shaver, 2014). In this 
study, we look into utility companies’ decision to adopt one particular type of renewable energy, i.e., 
solar power. The uncertainty associated with investing in solar technology allows us to empirically 
examine the effect of competitors’ prior decision on the focal firm’s investment when it is difficult 
for all firms to predict future returns.  
While solar generation capacity dramatically increased in the first decade of this century, the 
development of solar energy is still subject to technological and operational uncertainties. Terrestrial 
solar power applications have a history of less than fifty years. To capture the sun’s radiation and 
convert it into electricity, companies can use four major technologies, i.e., crystalline silicon, thin 
film, concentrated photovoltaic, and concentrated solar power. Yet, for each solar technology, utility 
companies face uncertainties associated with integration between different subsystems, e.g., solar 
modules, mounting system, grid interaction and curtailment, and connection arrangements. 
Variability in solar radiation level is another factor of uncertainty associated with solar energy 
investment. Utility companies can roughly predict sunlight level based on historical data, but the data 
need to be collected from a measuring station quite near to the solar project site. Notwithstanding 
the data accuracy, additional uncertainty exists in terms of converting the data to radiation in the 
angle of the solar array5. Take TECO Energy, Inc., a utility company based in Florida, for example. 
While Charles Hinson, vice president of state and community relations at TECO, expressed their 
confidence on natural gas, he doubted the future of renewable energy technologies: “other clean 
power generation like wind and solar are yet to be reliable”6. 
In addition, the fact that electric utility companies can choose from a variety of renewable 
technologies to meet the renewable energy policy requirement aggravates the uncertainty in 
5  Please see detailed introduction in Wolfe, P. 2013. Solar photovoltaic projects in the mainstream power market. Routledge. 
6  Erny Zah. “TECO buys New Mexico Gas Company for $950 million”. The Daily Times, 10 July 2014.  
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estimating returns from developing solar energy7. Renewable energy resources include electricity 
produced from water, wind, solar thermal/PV, geothermal energy, and biomass (e.g., biofuels, waste, 
and wood and derived fuels). The federal Energy Policy Act of 2005 requests that the total amount 
of renewable electric energy consumed by the federal government during 2013 and thereafter should 
not be less than 7.5%, and provide load guarantees for entities that develop or use innovative green 
technologies. Even before the Energy Policy Act of 2005, state governments have established their 
own renewable portfolio standards (RPS) that utility companies are required to meet. The state of 
California, for example, enacted legislation in 2002 that requires electric utilities to have 33% of their 
retail sales derived from eligible renewable resources in 2010 and all subsequent years. Among all 
renewable energy technologies, wind power has particularly made substantial advances in reliability 
improvement and cost reduction in recent decades. Some utility companies think that wind 
technology offers the most promise for meeting the RPS requirement. For example, company 
executive of Black Hills Corporation, an energy company based in South Dakota, said:  
“Among all (of the renewable energy sources), wind is clearly more cost-effective 
than solar, so we’re looking closely at wind.”8  
Xcel Energy, on the contrary, invested in a number of renewable technologies. It claimed itself as 
the nation’s No.1 wind power provider for the past decade, and meanwhile made a statement about 
solar technology on its webpage: “We believe in the power of the sun. In a big way.” Hence, given 
the inherent environmental uncertainty in solar and other renewable energy technologies, it is 
difficult for utility companies to predict the nature of solar technology development and returns for 
investing in this new area.  
7  28 states specify minimum solar energy requirement of renewable portfolio standard (RPS). Nonetheless, utility companies can meet 
the requirement via, for example, home or business owner rebate incentive program, rather than investing in building utility-scale solar 
projects. 
8   Patrick Malone. “Black Hills files renewable plan; Key questions linger over state’s tougher energy mandates” The Pueblo Chieftain, 
10 Nov 2010. 
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To isolate utility companies’ solar energy investment decision from their experimental 
investment, we focus on the utility-scale solar projects. The term “utility-scale” is used for large-scale 
grid connected photovoltaic generation. Utility-scale solar power generation is designed for feeding 
electric energy into the grid. Alternatively, electric utility companies can meet the RPS requirement 
by developing distributed solar solutions that connect small solar power generation equipment to the 
utility distribution system or where the energy is used. Duke Energy, for instance, formed a 
partnership with Integrys Energy Services to jointly develop rooftop and small ground-mounted 
photovoltaic solar projects that serve a local energy user or distributed power application. Green 
Mountain Power Corporation, on the contrary, began investing in utility-scale solar farms after a 
series of small-scale solar farms.  
Hypotheses 
In accordance with propositions derived from the analytical models, we posit a U-shaped 
relationship between competitors’ presence and the focal firms’ investment in utility-scale solar 
projects. Nevertheless, because we see utility companies’ investment in large-scale solar project as a 
sign of commitment to solar technology, it would cause at least a modest level of rivalry and 
countervail the benefits of imitation. For this reason, we expect utility companies to first avoid 
building large-scale solar projects as more competitors invest in solar technology. Yet, at a high level 
of expected competition, the rivalry effect of competitors’ presence would be dominated by the 
information effect because the investment choice made by competitors reveals particularly 
optimistic information about the nature of solar power development and returns for investing in this 
novel area. We thus expect that the likelihood of utility companies investing in large-scale solar 
projects increases with competitors’ presence at a higher level of rivalry. Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 1A: All else being equal, the likelihood that electric utilities invest in 
large-scale solar projects will first decrease and then increase (the U-shaped effect) as 
more competitors invest in solar technology.  
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We estimate the U-shaped effect of competitors’ presence in different types of electricity 
suppliers. The U.S electric utility industry consists of traditional utilities and independent power 
producers (IPP). Traditional utilities possess transmission facilities and sell power in any retail 
service territory where they have a franchise. IPPs, also known as non-utility generators, own 
facilities to generate electric power for sale to utility companies and end users. The literature on 
strategic groups suggests that firms tend to respond to competitors that follow similar strategies 
(Caves & Porter, 1977). Likewise, the resource-based scholars argue that resource similarity is the 
basis for firm interdependencies. The previous literature offers empirical evidence that firms tend to 
respond to most relevant competitors, e.g., firms in a focal area or within neighboring areas (Greve, 
2002; Cattani, et al, 2003).Therefore, we expect to find the U-shaped relationship within the group 
of direct competitors.  
Hypothesis 1B: All else being equal, the likelihood that electric utilities invest in 
large-scale solar projects will first decrease and then increase as more direct 
competitors invest in solar technology.  
While we predict in Hypothesis 1B that electric suppliers tend to respond to the presence of 
direct competitors, electric utility companies might see indirect electric utility competitors as 
potential cooperative partners. This particularly holds true in the U.S. electric utility industry. IPPs 
are potential partners of traditional utilities companies to generate electricity from renewable energy 
sources. IPPs have developed with institutional support since 1978 when the idea of competition  
was introduced into the traditionally regulated industry. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, for example, required electric utilities to purchase electricity from IPPs (Kim, 2013). 
Traditional utility companies own transmission facilities, whereas IPPs typically generate energy 
using renewable technologies at a small scale. Hence, we expect to find the following: 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, the likelihood that electric utilities invest in large-
scale solar projects will decrease more with the capacity of IPPs’ solar projects. 
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In addition to the U-shaped effect of competitors’ presence, our analytical models shed light 
on how utility companies’ inclination toward alternative energy sources (prior beliefs) affects their 
decision to develop solar energy. In the electric power industry, fossil fuels are the primary energy 
supply for electricity generation. In particular, coal, oil, and natural gas are three kinds of fossil fuels 
that we rely most on for our energy needs. Yet, fossil fuels are non-renewable; they are limited in 
supply and will one day be depleted. Moreover, fossil fuels are the major sources of greenhouse 
gases, accounting for approximately 35 percent of the total emission in the U.S. Thus, the past 
decades of years have witnessed the continuous pursuit of alternative energy sources in electric 
utility industry. Nuclear power, for example, gained momentum as a novel alternative technology 
during the time period between the 1960s and late 1980s. Our formal analysis suggests that utility 
companies with high inclination toward alternative energy sources tend to adopt novel technologies 
early. Because nuclear power and solar power use different technologies for electricity generation—
one from splitting atoms and the other converting sunlight into electricity—we contend that the 
timing of adopting nuclear power embodies utility companies’ inclination toward alternative energy 
sources, which in turn affects their commitment to solar energy.    
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, the likelihood that electric utilities invest in large-
scale solar projects will increase as a function of the timing of nuclear power 
adoption. 
In sum, we develop hypotheses in this section based on the analytical results of formal modeling. 
Hypothesis 1A and 1B predict a U-shaped relationship between competitors’ presence and firms’ 
decision on investing in large-scale solar projects. Hypothesis 2 extends the first two hypotheses 
regarding strategic similarity (dissimilarity) among competing companies. Hypothesis 3 summarizes 
the effect of firms’ prior beliefs on their investment decisions. In the next section, we will describe 
the sample and method of analysis.  
Data and Estimation 
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Sample and Data 
The sample in this study consists of all holding companies of investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) 
in the U.S from 2002 to 2013. Adopting a new energy generation technology is a strategic decision 
concerning the direction of the whole company as opposed to routinized decisions that can be 
decentralized to utility subsidiaries. Solar power plants are mostly owned and operated by a 
renewable-energy subsidiary under the utility parent company. MidAmerican Renewable, LLC, for 
instance, is a subsidiary of MidAmerican Energy Holding Company9; it operates wind, hydro, 
geothermal, and solar projects. Hence, we use utility holding company as the basic unit of analysis in 
this study. 
Twelve years of electric utility data were manually collected from a variety of public sources. 
The main data source is U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). In particular, the plant-level 
survey data were collected from Form EIA-860, and utility-level data from Form EIA-861. Other 
data sources include Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), Hoover’s 
database, Bloomberg’s database, Plunkett’s Energy Industry Almanac, Platt’s Energy Trader, and 
utility companies’ websites. The construction time of utility companies’ first large-scale solar project, 
for instance, was gathered from Form EIA-860, utility companies’ website, and public 
announcements in the form of company press releases and news releases.  
Our sample is based on all parent companies of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) in the U.S. 
IOUs are the largest players in the U.S. electric utility sector, providing services to around two thirds 
(68.5%) of customers in the U.S., although they comprise only a small portion of the total number 
of utility companies (5.8% in 2014) 10. According to the EIA-861 Annual Electric Power Industry 
Report, 176 investor-owned utilities (IOUs) operated in every state except Alaska in 2012. We 
collected information on the subsidiary status of each IOU via Hoover’s and Bloomberg’s database. 
9  MidAmerican Energy Holding Company changed its name to Berkshire Hathaway Energy in April 2014 
10 Please see APPA (American Public Power Association) U.S. Electric Utility Industry Statistical Report.  
19 
 
                                                          
The 176 IOUs are affiliated to 81 electric utility’s parent companies. Further, we explore our 
argument during the time period from 2002 to 2013. The earliest utility-scale solar farm was 
developed in 1984; Edison International, headquartered in Rosemead, CA, built Solar Energy 
Generating System I (SEGS I), a 13.8MW concentrated solar power (CSP) project in Daggett, 
California. Nonetheless, there were in total 16 solar projects established in the U.S. before 2002, and 
only two IOUs invested in utility-scale solar farms during that time period. After 2002, the first 
adoption by building utility-scale solar project in our sample took place in 2004, and two more utility 
holding companies decided to do so in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The first few years after 2002 
thus retained a similar solar energy development pattern as before 2002. Thus, the time period 
between 2002 and 2013 allows us to fully capture the trend of solar energy adoption in the electric 
utility sector.  
Dependent Variable and Method of Analysis 
Our hypotheses relate to the likelihood that utility companies adopt solar energy by building 
utility-scale solar farms. There are variations in the capacity of solar plants that are qualified as 
“utility-scale”, ranging from 25 kilowatts to tens of megawatts; a widely adopted capacity level is 5 or 
10 megawatts (MW). The number of solar plants increases if we drop the capacity threshold value. 
To improve the comprehensiveness of our study, we use 1 MW as the “utility-scale” capacity 
threshold value. Among the 81 holding companies of IOUs, 29 built utility-scale solar plants during 
the time period from 2002 to 2013. 
The time of solar farm construction is measured in discrete units (i.e., years in this study). 
Because the units are large relative to the total period of observation and the rate of event 
occurrence, we estimate the adoption likelihood using models of non-repeated events with discrete-
time data. The discrete time hazard is defined as ℎ𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
1−𝑃𝑡
, where 𝑃𝑡 = Pr (𝑇 = 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡) and 𝑇 is an 
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integer-valued random variable. 𝑃𝑡 refers to the probability that an event occurs at time t given that 
it has not already occurred.  
Further, time-variant fuel prices affect utility companies’ incentive to develop renewable 
energy because electricity generated from renewable sources can be perfectly substituted by coal, 
natural gas, and other fuel sources. In other words, the adoption likelihood would change as a 
function of time. To allow for arbitrary changes in the hazard with time, we use both maximum 
partial likelihood, i.e., semiparametric proportional hazard models (Cox, 1975), and maximum 
likelihood, i.e., logistic regression for non-repeated events. Specifically, the proportional hazard 
model is specified as follows: 
ℎ𝑖𝑡�𝑿𝒊(𝑡)� = ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽′𝑿𝒊(𝑡)), 
where ℎ𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑡) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡) allows for a linear effect of time. Alternatively, we converted 
each utility parent company’s event history into a set of distinct observations, and then pooled these 
observations and estimated a logistic regression model with time as an explanatory variable. 
Independent Variables 
Competitors’ presence. We count the number of utility companies that (1) conducted operating 
activities in the same geographic areas as the focal firm and (2) completed construction of solar 
projects in a certain year. Based on the type of competitors, we developed two measures for 
competitors’ presence: IOU competitors and IPP competitors. IOU competitors consist of all traditional 
utility companies, including municipal departments and power agencies, cooperatives, political 
subdivisions, State agencies and power pools, marketing agencies, and power marketers. In addition 
to independent power producers, industrial and commercial plants, including those that are owned 
or partly owned by traditional utilities, are also included in the count of IPP competitors. The 
average number of IOU competitors is 0.78 with a maximum of 9. The average number of IPP 
competitors is 7.28 with a maximum of 71.  
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IPP Capacity. IPP capacity is calculated as the total capacity of solar plants installed in a 
certain year by IPP competitors operating in the same geographic regions. The average capacity of 
IPP competitors’ solar projects is 97.45 MW with a maximum of 3165.1 MW.  
Nuclear power. We construct a variable of “nuclear power” as a proxy for utility companies’ 
inclination toward alternative energy sources. The first commercial nuclear plant was opened in the 
U.S. on May 26, 1958. Since then, nuclear power had expanded throughout the 1960s and the early 
1970s. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979, however, intensified the opposition of developing 
nuclear power plants. The 1980s witnessed nuclear power reactor cancellation and construction halt. 
We thus created three dummy variables to distinguish how early utility companies invested in 
nuclear power technology. Specifically, Nuke 1 takes a value of one if utility companies’ first nuclear 
reactor is built in 1960s, Nuke 2 takes a value of one if utility companies’ first nuclear reactor is built 
in 1970s, and Nuke 3 takes a value of one if utility companies’ first nuclear reactor is built in 1980s; 
the baseline group comprises those that never developed nuclear plants. 
Control Variables 
Geographic regions. We control for geographic regions in which the holding electric companies 
conduct operations. It partly captures the effect of external information that utility companies 
perceive from the environment. We employ North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) geographic classifications. NERC works with eight regional entities to improve the 
reliability of the bulk power system, i.e., Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), Midwest 
Reliability Organization (MRO), Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), ReliabilityFirst 
Corporation (RFC), Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC), Southwest Power Pool (SPP), 
Texas Regional Entity (TRE), and Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC). These entities 
cover the whole geographic territory of the U.S. We created eight dummy variables that take a value 
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of 1 if the electric company conducts operational activities in a particular NERC area. In the sample, 
16 holding companies operate in multiple NERC geographic regions. 
RPS Policy. State governments play an important role in supporting the development of 
renewable technologies. As of 2013, 28 states in the U.S. have established an RPS that requires a 
certain percentage of electric power suppliers’ sales come from renewable resources; among them, 
15 states have issued specific requirements that a certain percentage of the RPS be met using solar 
energy. The state of California, for example, is among the first adopting a renewable portfolio 
standard. The standard was originally issued in 2002. After amended, it requires that 25% of retail 
sales should be derived from renewable energy by 2016 and 33% by 2020; renewable technologies 
including solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, and certain hydroelectric electric are all eligible for the 
RPS. Arizona, on the other hand, established in 2006 a renewable energy standard of 6% by 2016 
and 10% by 2020; meanwhile, it specified 3% generated with solar technology.  
To control for the regulatory information, we develop two measures: (1) RPS policy measured 
the maximum renewables portfolio standard issued within the electric companies’ geographic 
regions each year from 2002 to 2013, and (2) RPS 2015 target measured the maximum RPS 
requirement in 2015. We also identified (3) solar policy, the maximum solar curve-outs within the 
electric companies’ geographic regions each year from 2002 to 2013, and (4) 2015 solar target, the 
maximum solar requirement in 2015 as alternative measures.    
Wind power. Wind power has been the fastest-growing source of new electric power 
generation for years. Though solar power development picked up momentum and exceeded a 50% 
growth rate since 2010, wind technology has accounted for the largest share of renewable electric 
generation (54.84% excluding hydropower in 2012). We created the dummy variable wind that takes 




Revenue and operating activities. We also control for the scale effect that large companies have 
slack resources and therefore might be more likely to invest in new technology. The variable Firm 
size is calculated as the logarithm of the total revenue in a certain year. In addition, we control for 
operating activities of electric power companies. Consistent with EIA classification, we categorized 
operating activities into generation, transmission, distribution, wholesale marketing, retail marketing, and 
bundled. Utility companies might involve multiple operating activities. We created six dummy 
variables that take a value of 1 if the electric company conducts a particular activity. 
Results 
In Table 1, we summarize descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. The 
correlations between first order variables are small to modest, suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
a serious problem. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and 2 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
We present in Table 2 the regression coefficient estimate results from Cox models that 
estimate the hazard of investor-owned utility holding companies’ development of utility-scale solar 
projects. Model 2.1 includes all control variables and the variable “Nuclear power”. As expected, 
utility companies that build wind power projects are less likely to commit a large investment to solar 
power technology. It indicates the underlying substitution among different types of renewable 
technologies when utility companies choose to develop alternative energy sources. Regulatory policy 
also exhibits significant effect on utility companies’ decision on building large-scale solar projects. 
We include two variables that control for RPS policy: the constant variable “RPS 2015 target ” and 
the time-varying variable “RPS policy”. The positive coefficient of “RPS 2015 target ” suggests that 
utility companies are forward-looking when choose to invest in solar energy as a response to 
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regulatory policy. The effect of regulatory policy, however, decreases over time as suggested by the 
negative coefficient of “RPS policy ”.  
In Model 2.2-2.6, we tested hypothesis 1A and 1B. These two hypotheses predicted a U-
shaped relationship between the presence of competitors and the likelihood of utility companies’ 
investing in large-scale solar projects. Hypothesis 1B further specified that the U-shaped relationship 
exists for competitors in the same electric utility group, i.e., traditional utility (IOU) competitors. We 
first estimated coefficients in the linear function of IOU competitors in Model 2.2; the effect is 
insignificant. Model 2.3 is the quadratic model of IOU competitors, and the coefficient of the squared 
IOU competitors is positive and significant at the 0.1 level. Though the coefficient of the linear term is 
insignificant, the sign is negative as expected. Likewise, we ran the same analysis in models 2.4-2.5 
for IPP competitors; neither the coefficient of IPP competitors nor the coefficient of the squared IPP 
competitors is significant. In Model 2.6, we included both types of competitors, and only found 
significant coefficients of IOU competitors. In particular, the positive coefficient of the quadratic term 
and the negative coefficient of the linear term point to a U-shaped relationship between competitors’ 
presence and the propensity of utility companies to build large-scale solar projects (figure 5). These 
results provide support to hypothesis 1A and 1B. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that utility companies’ propensity to invest in large-scale solar 
projects would decrease more with the total capacity of independent power producers’ newly added 
solar projects. We tested this hypothesis in model 2.7 by observing whether IPP capacity had an 
impact on how utility companies respond to the presence of competitors. As can be seen in Table 2, 
the coefficient of the interaction term between “IOU competitors” and “IPP capacity” is significantly 
negative (figure 6). The result is in line with our prediction that independent power producers are 
potential cooperative partners rather than direct competitors to investor-owned utility companies.  
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To correctly interpret the finding of U-shaped relationship, we assess the magnitude of 
coefficient estimates and plot the models within the range of our data. In figure 5, we draw the curve 
based on the coefficient estimates in model 2.7 that reflects the effect of IOU competitors on the 
likelihood that the focal electric utility company invests in building large-scale solar projects. The 
inflection point is approximately where the variable, IOU competitors, takes the value 2. In other 
words, the curve decreases at a decreasing rate until the inflection point, and then increases as IOU 
competitors takes larger values. Furthermore, we illustrate in figure 6 how the U-shaped relationship 
between IOU competitors’ presence and the focal utility company’s investment decision is modified 
by IPP competitors’ newly added solar capacity (IPP capacity). The graph was drawn based on the 
coefficient estimates in model 2.7 and the range of independent variables. As shown in figure 6, IPP 
capacity extends the negative effect of IOU competitors on the focal utility company’s propensity to 
invest in large-scale solar projects. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 and 6 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 3 delineates how utility companies’ inclination (prior beliefs) toward alternative 
energy source affected their decision on investing in large-scale solar projects. We included dummy 
variables of “Nuclear power” in all models. As shown in Table 2, the coefficient of variable “Nuke 1 
(1960s)” is significantly positive in all estimations using Cox models. We draw graphs of hazard 
functions for utility companies that developed nuclear plants in 1960s (nuke_earlybird) and for the 
counterpart group that developed later or didn’t develop nuclear plants (Figure 7). Figure 7 
illustrates distinct difference between these two groups. This finding is in line with hypothesis 3. It 
suggests that utility companies that first developed nuclear energy tend to have strong beliefs on 





Insert Figure 7 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Robustness Test 
We conduct robust tests using maximum likelihood methods to identify the shape of the 
relationship between competitors’ presence and utility companies’ large-scale solar energy 
investment decision. To eliminate spurious correlation in Model 2.2-2.7 caused by changes in fuel 
prices over time, we allowed for arbitrary changes in the baseline hazard with time in our models. 
Assuming the underlying continuous-time models, we use exact partial likelihood method to 
estimate results using Cox models. Nevertheless, the method only allows for a linear effect of time. 
We draw in figure 8 the hazard function of IOU investing in utility-scale solar projects, and it 
exhibits association with time. In particular, as shown in figure 8b, the smoothed hazard estimate is a 
curvilinear function. 
Similar to the long-form dataset structure employed in the partial likelihood method, we 
break each utility company’s event history into a set of distinct observations, one for each year until 
censoring or an event occurred (utility company-years). For each of these observations, we coded 
the dependent variable as one if an event occurred, otherwise as zero. We then pooled these 
observations and estimate a logistic regression, or a complementary log-log model, by maximum 
likelihood method. These approaches allow for great flexibility in specifying the time function and 
utilizing advanced econometrics methods for panel data analysis.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 and Table 3 here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The estimate results are presented in Table 3. In Model 3.1 and 3.2, we include both the 
linear and the squared terms of ‘Year” in logistic and complementary log-log regression. All 
coefficient estimates stay consistent with those in model 2.7. We estimate the random effect model 
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to control for unobserved heterogeneity in Model 3.3. The estimation results are quite similar to 
model 3.1. In model 3.4, we use generalized estimating equations (GEE) with robust standard errors 
to generate efficient estimates of coefficients. As expected, the coefficient estimates are downscaled 
in GEE model compared to other estimation models, but the results are consistent with other 
models. In sum, the maximum likelihood methods did not materially change the results.  
Discussion 
In this study, we identify with formal analytical models a U-shaped relationship between 
competitors’ presence and the focal firm’s decision-making. Using data of electric utility companies’ 
investment in utility-scale solar plants, we find empirical evidence for our predications: utility 
companies tend to avoid investing in a novel area as more competitors appear; yet as the intensity of 
competition further increases, their reactions turn into imitation.  
Our arguments center on the dual role that competitors’ prior action plays in the focal firm’s 
belief updating and decision making under uncertainty: information and competition. On the one 
hand, it heralds an attractive opportunity of taking a certain choice, and on the other hand, lowers 
expectations on future returns because of intensified competition. Consistent with previous studies, 
we find that competition leads to avoidance in the focal firm’s decision making. Yet we also find that, 
in a highly uncertain environment, the twofold roles interact in determining how firms respond to 
competitors’ prior action. Specifically, in addition to a separate, negative effect on future investment 
returns, competition affects a firm’s decision making by strengthening the positive informational 
cues of competitors’ presence in a highly uncertain market. In other words, investment decision 
made by competitors at a high level of rivalry implies particularly optimistic information about the 
new investment opportunity. As such, the benefits of imitation would not be outweighed by the 
countervailing effect of competition, which ultimately leads to imitation at a high level of 
competition and generates a U-shaped relationship. 
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This paper has significant implications for the literature on firms’ strategic decision making 
under uncertainty, e.g., investment in novel technologies, entry to a new product market, or 
expansion into foreign markets. It is well known in the extant studies that there are two distinct 
decision-making patterns: imitation and avoidance. When multimarket competition takes place in the 
novel markets, for example, firms exhibit mimetic behavior instead of mutual forbearance because 
uncertainty causes them to rely on competitors’ action to estimate the investment opportunity 
(Anand, et al, 2009). Yet, competition countervails the benefits of imitation, and therefore weakens 
the incentive for investment. For this reason, the previous literature suggests an inverted U-shaped 
relationship: firms imitate initially competitors’ action and avoid later making the same decision as 
the competitive intensity increases (e.g., Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Koçak, & Özcan, 2013; Alcácer, et 
al, 2015). The underlying assumption, however, is that the dual role of competitors’ presence has 
independent effects, though in opposite directions, on the focal firms’ future payoffs from investing 
in a novel area. Overlooking the link between these two mechanisms could mislead us into drawing 
an incomplete conclusion about how firms respond to competitors’ presence in a novel market. 
Moreover, our research responds to the call for studies that link theories to environmental 
conditions where they are most applicable (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). We focuses in this study on 
one particular type of uncertainty, i.e., environmental or market uncertainty (Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006; Gaba & Terlaak 2013). It is characterized by a lack of information that makes it difficult for all 
firms to predict the future payoffs from taking a certain action. We aim to open the black box of 
how firms make strategic decisions under such uncertain situations. Behavioral decision making 
model advanced by Cyert and March (1963) has provoked a broad research interest in “search 
activities”. In this paper, we take a different route to untangle the question. Drawing insights on the 
selection activity from Nelson and Winter (1982), we build stylized decision making models, and 
discern a strengthening effect of intensified competition on the information role of competitor’s 
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prior action. The results reiterate the importance of environmental conditions, and demonstrate that 
uncertainty engenders a certain type of competitive dynamics between competing firms. The 
condition of environmental uncertainty delineates the circumspect conditions for this study. We 
should emphasize that, throughout the analysis in this study, uncertainty does not resolve when 
firms invest in a novel market. This attribute of environmental uncertainty has important 
implications for modeling firms’ decision-making. Specifically, it undermines the first-mover 
advantage and incentives for preemption investment (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Moreover, 
it distinguishes from real options investments that are characterized by sequential investment 
decisions, in which future investment opportunities are contingent on firms’ prior investment 
commitments (McGrath, 1997; Adner & Levinthal, 2004; Folta & O’Brien, 2004).  
Our study also has important implications for practice. Firms exhibit different decision-
making patterns in a highly uncertain environment compared to a relatively mature phase of an 
industry. In the latter case, taking imitative decision-making pattern is straightforward because 
competitors are seen to provide superior products, process, and organizational system; competition, 
however, countervails the benefits of imitation. In the former case where it is difficult for all firms to 
predict future payoffs from investing in the novel market, our analysis shows that first-movers 
would initially attract new entrants because their actions reveal optimistic information about future 
development. As more competitors appear, firms would be less likely to make same decisions as 
their competitors do. Yet imitative moves become the decision-making pattern again as the intensity 
of competition further increases. The different competitive dynamics indicates that firms’ 
competitive advantage would be less likely to be eroded by new entrants if they enter the new 
market at the right time. Moreover, we develop several additional hypotheses based both on the 
analytical results and on the specific features of the empirical context. The empirical examination 
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enhances our understanding of the underlying mechanism of solar energy adoption in the U.S. 
electric utility industry. 
Several limitations apply to this research. First, our study captures a certain stage of industry 
evolution, e.g., environmental disturbance caused by, for instance, new technological changes. It is 
not our primary interest in this paper to provide a comprehensive understanding of how firms 
respond to competitors’ presence along the continuum of uncertainty as a market or an industry 
evolves. Yet it would be an interesting research project to look into the differences in firms’ decision 
making patterns across various stages. Second, we use the U.S. electric utility companies’ 
commitment to develop utility-scale solar projects as an appropriate context for empirical 
examination. Our empirical examination is limited to the U.S. utility electric companies. 
Nevertheless, our formal models are applicable to a wide variety of strategic decision-making 
scenarios. We believe that further research could test the predictions in other proper contexts.   
Conclusion 
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the effect of competitors’ prior action 
on firms’ decision-making under environmental disturbance. Unlike the inverted U-shaped 
relationship in previous studies, we propose a U-shaped relationship between competitors’ presence 
in a novel market and the focal firm’s decision-making. Results from our models suggest that two 
mechanisms, i.e., learning (information) and competition, interact to determine how competitors’ 
presence affects a firm’s decision making. Competition can strengthen the information role of 
competitors’ prior action, as well as countervailing the favorable information revealed from 
competitors’ action. We choose utility companies’ investment decision to build large-scale solar 
projects as the context for empirical examination, and find empirical support to our predictions. 
This study contributes to a broad array of literature on strategic decision making under uncertainty. 
It helps us identify the causal mechanisms underlying firms’ decision making in a highly uncertain 
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environment. In particular, we emphasize the environmental conditions, and formally establish more 
precise boundary conditions for various theoretical perspectives of firms’ decision-making under 
uncertainty. Understanding how firms make strategic decision is a critical task in Strategy. We 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. IOU competitors 0.78 1.53 0 9 1.00 
        
   
2.IOU competitors (squared) 2.94 9.94 0 81 0.90 1.00 
       
   
3. IPP competitors 7.28 12.16 0 71 0.79 0.68 1.00 
      
   
4. IPP competitors (squared) 200.77 523.65 0 5041 0.76 0.74 0.93 1.00 
     
   
5. IPP capacity 97.45 399.60 0 3165 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.67 1.00 
    
   
6. Nuke 1 (1960s) 0.12 0.33 0 1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.07 1.00 
   
   
7. Nuke 2 (1970s) 0.21 0.41 0 1 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.19 1.00 
  
   
8. Nuke 3 (1980s) 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.12 -0.16 1.00 
 
   
9. RPS 2015 target 9.52 9.50 0 38 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 0.17 -0.22 0.08 1.00    
10. RPS policy 3.87 7.28 0 36 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.15 -0.19 0.07 0.81 1.00   
11. Wind energy 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.23 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 1.00  
12. Geographic region NERC_TRE 0.09 0.29 0 1 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.12 0.16 0.03 -0.24 -0.15 -0.07 1.00 
13. Geographic region NERC_FRCC 0.04 0.19 0 1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.20 -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 
14. Geographic region NERC_RFC 0.29 0.45 0 1 -0.02 -0.04 0.13 0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.29 -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.18 0.10 
15. Geographic region NERC_SERC 0.17 0.38 0 1 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.24 0.04 -0.33 -0.22 -0.18 0.21 
16. Geographic region NERC_SPP 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.10 -0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.27 -0.17 0.17 0.37 
17. Geographic region NERC_WECC 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.21 -0.01 -0.15 0.20 0.04 -0.06 0.14 -0.09 
18. Revenue (logarithm) 13.59 2.81 0 20.74 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.22 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.09 
19. Operating activity_generation 0.75 0.43 0 1 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.18 -0.11 -0.07 0.33 -0.16 
20. Operating activity_transmission 0.73 0.45 0 1 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.19 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 
21. Operating activity_wholesale mkt 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.27 -0.03 -0.08 0.25 -0.02 
22. Operating activity_retailing mkt 0.21 0.41 0 1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.21 -0.16 
23. Operating activity_bundled 0.37 0.48 0 1 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.12 -0.06 
 
Variable  
   
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
13. Geographic region NERC_FRCC  
   
1.00 
       
  
14. Geographic region NERC_RFC  
   
-0.13 1.00 
      
  
15. Geographic region NERC_SERC  
   
0.11 -0.04 1.00 
     
  
16. Geographic region NERC_SPP  
   
-0.07 -0.02 0.08 1.00 
    
  
17. Geographic region NERC_WECC  
   
-0.11 -0.30 -0.25 -0.13 1.00 
   
  
18. Revenue (logarithm)  
   
0.00 0.26 0.07 -0.03 0.05 1.00 
  
  
19. Operating activity_generation  
   
-0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.26 1.00 
 
  
20. Operating activity_transmission  
   
0.12 -0.29 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.37 0.28 1.00 
 
  
21. Operating activity_wholesale mkt  
   
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.06 0.32 0.47 0.39 1.00   
22. Operating activity_retailing mkt     -0.10 0.16 -0.13 -0.07 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.20 1.00  
23. Operating activity_bundled     0.00 0.17 0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.22 0.24 0.08 0.29 0.06 1.00 
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Table 2: Examining predictions of electric power companies’ decision of building solar plants  
 
Variables 
Cox Regression – Exact Marginal Likelihood 
   2.1   2. 2   2. 3    2.4   2.5    2.6    2.7 
RPS 2015 target   0.235***  0.238***  0.246***  0.236***  0.247***  0.263***  0.224*** 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.082) 
RPS policy -0.196** -0.199** -0.208** -0.197** -0.211** -0.227*** -0.204** 
(0.081) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081) (0.083) (0.886) (0.084) 
Wind energy -3.239*** -3.225*** -3.314*** -3.248*** -3.603*** -3.603*** -3.016*** 
(1.041) (1.034) (1.049) (1.046) (1.131) (1.136) (1.091) 
Geographic region NERC_TRE -0.367 -0.371 -0.529 -0.377 -0.573 -0.748 -1.001 
(0.973) (0.976) (0.993) (0.977) (0.995) (1.001) (1.127) 
Geographic region NERC_FRCC  2.242*  2.299*  2.322*  2.247*  2.416*  2.488**  1.988 
 (1.231) (1.241) (1.241) (1.231) (1.243) (1.250) (1.233) 
Geographic region NERC_RFC  0.754  0.694  0.874  0.818  1.287  1.727*  0.954 
(0.586) (0.600) (0.611) (0.810) (0.900) (0.943) (0.639) 
Geographic region NERC_SERC  1.318*  1.309*  1.350*  1.342*  1.493*  1.693**  0.928 
(0.749) (0.752) (0.759) (0.777) (0.792) (0.819) (0.780) 
Geographic region NERC_SPP  1.130  1.112  1.509  1.177  1.594  2.236  1.733 
(1.354) (1.348) (1.351) (1.1.416) (1.508) (1.505) (1.324) 
Geographic region NERC_WECC  2.256***  2.095***  2.356***  2.336***  2.987***  3.470***  2.501*** 
(0.677) (0.755) (1.773) (0.973) (1.137) (1.257) (0.810) 
Annual Revenue (logarithm)  0.138  0.144  0.158  0.137  0.148  0.164  0.196 
(0.130) (0.133) (0.136) (0.130) (0.134) (0.138) (0.142) 
Operating activity_Generation -0.564 -0.559 -0.544 -0.563 -0.574 -0.540 -0.424 
(0.692) (0.691) (0.709) (0.691) (0.697) (0.706) (0.731) 
Operating activity_Transmission  0.485  0.491  0.549  0.479  0.308  0.398  1.061 
(0.902) (0.902) (0.921) (0.904) (0.925) (0.944) (1.065) 
Operating activity_Wholesale mkt  0.128  0.090  0.172  0.129  0.031  0.126  0.133 
 (0.558) (0.564) (0.574) (0.558) (0.566) (0.578) (0.595) 
Operating activity_Retailing mkt  1.428**  1.430**  1.434**  1.429**  1.466**  1.470**  1.302** 
(0.576) (0.576) (0.582) (0.576) (0.592) (0.590) (0.578) 
Operating activity_Bundled  0.480  0.490  0.443  0.476  0.429  0.376  0.334 
(0.488) (0.491) (0.498) (0.489) (0.496) (0.501) (0.510) 
Nuke 1 (1960s)  1.767
**  1.770**  1.887**  1.771**  1.847**  1.964**  1.989*** 
(0.743) (0.742) (0.758) (0.744) (0.764) (0.775) (0.763) 
Nuke 2 (1970s)  1.806**  1.798**  1.850**  1.809**  2.063**  2.006**  1.529 
(0.887) (0.890) (0.918) (0.888) (0.935) (0.957) (0.951) 
Nuke 3 (1980s)  0.462  0.465  0.419  0.468  0.704  0.583  0.668 
(0.798) (0.797) (0.793) (0.800) (0.832) (0.826) (0.811) 
IOU competitors 
 
 -0.073 -0.544   -0.597* -1.033** 
 (0.150) (0.339)   (0.354) (0.415) 
IOU competitors (squared)         0.092*    0.104*  0.247*** 
  (0.046)   (0.054) (0.861) 
IPP competitors    -0.004 -0.075 -0.073  
   (0.032) (0.064) (0.067)  
IPP competitors (squared) 
       
     0.001  0.001  
    (0.001) (0.001)  
IOU competitors × IPP capacity  
       
      -0.001* 
      (0.001) 
Log likelihood -69.09 -63.98 -61.81 -64.09 -63.21 -61.05 -58.00 
LR χ2 against null model  62.58  62.81  67.14  62.59  64.34  68.66  74.76 















RPS 2015 target    0.218**     0.208***   0.218**     0.187*** 
 (0.085) (0.077) (0.085) (0.065) 
RPS policy   -0.197**  -0.187**   -0.197**    -0.173*** 
 (0.088) (0.077) (0.088) (0.063) 
Wind energy   -2.884***    -2.663***   -2.884***   -2.489*** 
 (1.082) (0.993) (1.082) (0.730) 
Geographic region NERC_TRE -1.091         -0.978 -1.091 -1.268* 
 (1.156) (1.068) (1.156) (0.753) 
Geographic region NERC_FRCC 1.889 1.757 1.889 1.586 
 (1.285) (1.216) (1.285) (1.331) 
Geographic region NERC_RFC 0.931 0.907 0.931  0.716 
 (0.702) (0.624) (0.702) (0.569) 
Geographic region NERC_SERC 0.984 0.913 0.984 0.807 
 (0.832) (0.771) (0.832) (0.746) 
Geographic region NERC_SPP   1.741** 1.652   1.741** 1.533 
 (1.347) (1.306) (1.347) (1.200) 
Geographic region NERC_WECC     2.667***     2.412***     2.667***    2.208*** 
 (0.894) (0.769) (0.894) (0.642) 
Annual Revenue (logarithm) 0.227 0.205 0.227   0.199** 
 (0.148) (0.137) (0.148) (0.099) 
Operating activity_Generation         -0.378         -0.389        -0.378 -0.347 
 (0.772) (0.708) (0.772) (0.553) 
Operating activity_Transmission 1.175 1.206 1.175 0.994 
 (1.129) (1.035) (1.129) (1.041) 
Operating activity_Wholesale mkt  0.262* 0.173  0.262*   0.225** 
 (0.633) (0.574) (0.633) (0.605) 
Operating activity_Retailing mkt   1.233**   1.130**   1.233** 0.941* 
 (0.601) (0.552) (0.601) (0.568) 
Operating activity_Bundled           0.257 0.285         0.257 0.218 
 (0.538) (0.497) (0.538) (0.441) 
Nuke 1 (1960s)   1.976**   1.831**   1.976**   1.577** 
 (0.764) (0.718) (0.764) (0.651) 
Nuke 2 (1970s) 1.436 1.337 1.436 1.147 
 (0.947) (0.888) (0.947) (0.783) 
Nuke 3 (1980s)           0.658 0.694         0.658 0.640 
 (0.873) (0.790) (0.873) (0.748) 
IOU competitors 
 
  -0.998**         -0.904**   -0.998**     -0.782*** 
(0.442) (0.384) (0.442) (0.293) 
IOU competitors (squared)          0.269***   -0.244***    0.269***   -0.202*** 
(0.092) (0.077) (0.092) (0.048) 
IOU competitors × IPP capacity   -0.001**   -0.001**  -0.001**   -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Year     2.486***     2.356***    2.486***   2.058** 
 (0.825) (0.783) (0.825) (0.805) 
Year (squared)   -0.102**   -0.097**  -0.102** -0.084* 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) 
Log likelihood -74.53 -73.84 -74.53  
LR/Wald χ2 against null model 105.03 106.40 44.76 177.18 
Notes. N = 867. Standard errors are in parentheses. LR, likelihood ratio.   *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
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Figure 1: The impact of firm 1’s investment on firm 2’s incentive to invest in the same domain given 
that = 1 √2⁄ , (1 √2⁄ = 0.707) . 
 
 
Figure 2: Two numerical examples concerning the impact of firm 1’s investment on firm 2’s 
incentive to invest in the same domain given that 𝛾 < 1 √2⁄ , i.e., 𝛾 = 0.15 and 𝛾 = 0.4. 
  



















1 lambda_1 = 1 / sqrt(2) * la



















1 lambda_1 = 1 / sqrt(2) * la
lambda_1 = gamm
lambda_1 = (1/2gamma)*lambda_2




















lambda_1 = 1 / sqrt(2)  
lambda_1 = .4 * la



























Figure 3: Two numerical examples concerning the impact of firm 1’s investment on firm 2’s 
incentive to invest in the same domain given that 𝛾 > 1 √2⁄ , i.e., 𝛾 = 0.9 and 𝛾 = 1.5. 
 
Figure 4: The impact of firm 1’s investment on firm 2’s incentive to invest in the same domain given 
that 𝜆1 = 0.4. and 𝜆2 = 0.2. 
 
Figure 5: The U-shaped relationship between competitors’ presence and the focal firm’s investment 
















































































Figure 6: The impact of IPPs’ newly added solar capacity 
 
Figure 7: Hazard functions for utility companies that developed nuclear plants in 1960s and the 
counterpart group 
 
Figure 8: Cumulative hazard (8a) and smoothed hazard estimate (8b) of IOU investing in utility-scale 
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Appendix A: 
Consider a duopoly product market competition in which firms face a downward demand curve. Without 
competitive interaction, firm i’s inverse demand function is given by 
𝑝𝑖 =  𝑎 − 𝑏𝑑𝑖 
where 𝑑𝑖 is the demanded quantity of firm i’s product, and 𝑝𝑖 is the highest price that firm i can charge and 
still generate demanded quantity 𝑑𝑖 . Nevertheless, if one firm’s product has impact on demands for another 
firm’s product, the demand function is specified as,  
𝑝𝑖 =  𝑎 − 𝑏𝑑𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑗, 
where 𝑑𝑗 is the demanded quantity of firm j’s product. Assume a monotonically increasing production 
function of investment (cost) represented by, 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑖).  
where 𝐼𝑖 stands for the minimum investment required for producing quantity 𝑑𝑖 . Then, we can specify the 
profit function, earnings gross of production cost, as the following expression: 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 1)𝐼𝑖 − 𝑏𝐼𝑖2 + 𝑑𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑗. 
The profit function can be generalized as 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝜇𝐼𝑖 −
1
2
𝐼𝑖2 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑗, 





Since firm 1’s investment choice is specified as,  
𝐼1,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆1)?̂?1,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑧1,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼2,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼1,𝑡
                                     (1)  















− 1)?̂?1,𝑡−1                                          (2) 
Firm 2, on the other hand, would choose the investment decision that maximizes its profits. The first order 
condition yields  
𝜕𝜋2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡






𝜆2𝑧1,𝑡 − 𝐼2,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡 = 0                              (3) 
Substituting the expression for 𝑧1,𝑡 into (3) we have:  
𝜕𝜋2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡





















𝜇�1,𝑡−1� − 𝐼2,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡  

















?̂?1,𝑡−1 − 𝐼2,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡   

















?̂?1,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡 
Solving for 𝜕𝜋2,𝑡
𝜕𝐼2,𝑡
= 0, we have  











𝐼1,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐼1,𝑡 −
𝜆2(1−𝜆1)
2𝜆1
?̂?1,𝑡−1             (4) 
where  𝜔 = 1 − 𝜆2𝛾
2𝜆1
. 
We assume the second-order partial derivative of firm 2’s investment with respect to firm 1’s 














Substituting 𝜔 = 1 − 𝜆2𝛾
2𝜆1


























                                          (5)  
☐ 
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